BATTERED WOMEN AND THE REQUIREMENT OF IMMINENCE IN SELF-DEFENCE by Samantha Goosen
 
 
Author: S Goosen 
 
 
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE REQUIREMENT OF IMMINENCE 
IN SELF-DEFENCE 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v16i1.4 
 
2013 VOLUME 16 No 1 
ISSN 1727-3781 
 S GOOSEN    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
71 / 536 
 
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE REQUIREMENT OF IMMINENCE IN SELF-
DEFENCE 
 
S Goosen
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Certain types of intentional killing are no longer regarded as unlawful, and therefore 
are not punished as murder. South Africa recognises that killing in self-defence is 
justifiable,  and  therefore  not  murder.
1 Burchell offers the following definition of 
private defence: 
 
A person who is the victim of an unlawful attack upon person, property or other 
recognized legal interest may resort to force to repel such attack. Any harm or 
damage inflicted upon an aggressor in the course of such private defence is not 
unlawful.
2 
 
Burchell has noted that two important and yet somewhat conflicting themes shape 
the structure of the law of private defence. One is that private defence involves a 
choice between two evils, and that in choosing, the lesser evil is to be preferred. The 
evils  are  set  out  as  follows.  Firstly,  the  harm  threatened  by  an  attack  upon  the 
interests of an individual. Secondly, harm perpetrated against the legal interest of 
the attacker, in the process of repelling the attack. The doctrine of the lesser evil 
requires that the defender should not inflict greater harm than that threatened by 
the initial attack. Burchell notes: "the central organizing principle of this approach is 
thus the comparative assessment of harms involved".
3  
 
The opposing approach is one which justifies private defence using the concept of 
the autonomous individual. The theory underlying this approach is that every person 
has the right to protect their legal interests, and is under no obligation to surrender 
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these rights in order to avoid inflicting some evil on another person. According to 
this approach, an individual who chooses to infringe the rights of another is the 
author of the harm suffered in the course of a defensive response to an attack.
4  
 
Snyman  refers  to  two  justifications  for  the  existence  of  private  defence.  The 
protection  theory  emphasises  individuals  and  their  right  to  defend  themselves 
against an unlawful attack. In respect of upholding justice theory, people acting in 
private defence perform defensive acts, thereby assisting in upholding the legal 
order. Private defence is meant to prevent justice from yielding to injustice. These 
acts are now subject to the Constitution.
5 This point was noted in S v Walters,
6 that: 
 
self-defence is treated in our law as a species of private defence ... Until now, our 
law has allowed killing in defence of life, but also has allowed killing in defence of 
property, or other legitimate interests, in circumstances in which it is reasonable 
and necessary to do so ... What is material is that the law applies a proportionality 
test, weighing the interest protected against the interest of the wrongdoer. The 
interests must now be weighed in light of the Constitution.
7 
 
Private defence forms part of South African common law. The courts are guided by 
the  Constitution  as  to  which  approach  is  to  be  followed  when  a  common-law 
principle, rule or doctrine, appears to be in conflict with the Constitution. Section 
39(2) provides that "when interpreting any legislation and developing the common-
law  or  customary  law,  every  court,  tribunal  or  forum  must  promote  the  spirit, 
purport and, objects of the Bill of Rights". This essentially means that the common 
law  must  be  "adapted  or  corrected,  where  applicable,  to  reflect  constitutional 
values".
8 Van Dikhorst J gave the following summary of the meaning of the section: 
 
Section  35(3)  [now  39(2)]  is  intended  to  permeate  our  judicial  approach  to 
interpretation  of  statutes  and  the  development  of  the  common  law  with  the 
fragrance  of  values  in  which  the  Constitution  is  anchored.  This  means  that 
wherever there is room for interpretation or development of our virile system of law 
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that is to be the point of departure. When in future the unruly horse of public policy 
is saddled, its rein and crop will be that value system.
9 
 
This assessment calls for a two-staged approach to be adopted. In respect of the 
first stage, the content and scope of the rights protected - including the meaning 
and objects of the conduct challenged - must be determined to establish if there is 
such deprivation or limitation.
10 If there is such a limitation, the enquiry would then 
proceed to the second stage. This stage entails a balancing process which applie s a 
proportionality test provided for in section 36(1) of the  Constitution. The abused 
woman relying on the conduct stipulated should be able to demonstrate that the 
limitation is justifiable under the Constitution.
11 
 
While the Constitution does not establish a hierarchy of rights, judges and academics 
have acknowledged that some rights are more foundational, constituting a core of 
rights from which others are derived. In S v Makwayane,
12 O'Regan J earmarked the 
right to life as "antecedent to all other righ ts in the Constitution." The same holds 
true for the right to dignity, especially when taken together with the right to life. To 
this should be added the right to bodily integrity. Ally and Viljoen note the meaning 
of the right to bodily integrity: 
 
Violence  against  an  individual  is  a  grave  invasion  of  personal  security.  Section 
12(1)(c)  requires  the  State  to  protect  individuals,  both  by  refraining  from  such 
invasions itself and by discouraging private individuals from such invasions.
13 
 
To meet constitutional muster, the limitation must be closely linked to its purpose.
14 
Abused women are entitled to protect their lives, and therefore can kill to achieve 
this purpose. However, an important factor in such an evaluation is if less restrictive 
means were available to achieve the stated objectives. As Ally and Viljoen note, one 
way of posing this question is to reformulate some of the case law as common law: 
"the use of violence, especially lethal force, can only be justified if it is necessary; 
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that is, if it is the only means to avoid death or grievous bodily harm".
15 While it 
could be said that the battered woman could have left the abusive relationship, the 
law does not require the abused woman to leave her home, nor does it expect 
ordinary persons to display acts of heroism. Therefore the death or serious bodily 
injury of the abuser caused as a result of the limitation can be justified when section 
36 is applied.
16 
 
Private defence is an extraordinary remedy that involves the infliction of harm upon 
another individual. To escape criminal liability for this act the defender must be able 
to show that her resort to private defence conformed to the social and legal norms 
that result in the use of self -help by citizens. In respect of self -defence the norms 
that apply require that the defender be able to provide evidence that the resort to 
force was necessary in the circumstances that she found herself in, and that she 
used means appropriate to the danger that confronted her. These requirements for 
successfully invoking the defence are expressed as conditions that must have been 
present or complied with. Such "triggering" conditions relate to the nature of the 
attack and the nature of the defender's response (the defence).
17  
 
For a situation of private defence to arise, e vidence must show (a) an attack, (b) 
upon a legally protected interest; and (c) that the attack was unlawful.  
 
The first requirement is that there must have been an attack. Fear alone is not 
sufficient to justify a defence.
18 Private defence may be utilised only where there is 
an attack which has already commenced or is imminent.
19 The term "commenced" 
means that private defence may be resorted to only where the attack has already 
begun and there is no time to seek other forms of protection.
20 Burchell notes that 
"imminent means that the attack is about to begin immediately  - what is important 
here is not so much the imminence of the threat, but rather the immediacy of the 
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response required to avoid the attack. If the nature of the attack is such that the 
threatened harm cannot be avoided, the victim should be entitled to act with such 
anticipation as is necessary for effective protection."
21 It was noted in S v Mokgiba 
22 
that— 
 
The appellant was reasonable in his belief that his attacker did not come to visit 
him or to look for work. The actions of the attacker posed an immediate threat to 
the bodily integrity and the life of the man and his wife. The appellant was entitled 
to use all his strength and remedies he had at his disposal, even if these remedies 
meant  that  his  attacker  would  die  in  the  process.  There  was  no  duty  on  the 
appellant to wait until his attacker first physically harmed him, or to ask him what 
the purpose of his visit was, before he defended himself.
23  
 
In R v Zikalala 
24 the court held that: 
 
The observation places a risk upon the appellant that he was not obliged to bear. 
He was not called upon to stake his life upon a 'reasonable chance to get away.' If 
he had done so he may well have figured as the deceased at the trial instead of the 
accused.
25 
 
The attack must not have been completed, and any measure taken after the attack 
has ended 
26 would be retaliatory rather than defensive and therefore unjustified. 
This is problematic, as battered women tend to kill in instances where their abuser is 
asleep or incapacitated and there is no imminent threat of harm. Some academics 
have suggested that victims of battered woman syndrome ought to be allowed to 
pre-empt the anticipated and inevitable attack of the abusive spouse, and it would 
appear as if South African courts are moving in that direction. Since 1947, South 
African law has dealt with the question of whether an accused who relied on self -
defence and acted lawfully must be judged by objective standards. This point was 
demonstrated in S v Motleleni:
27 
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The question whether an accused, who relies on self-defence, has acted lawfully 
must  be  judged  by  objective  standards.  In  applying  these  standards  one  must 
decide what the fictitious reasonable man, in the position of the accused and in 
light of all the circumstances would have done.
28 
 
Snyman  suggests  that  "reasonableness  is  a  relative  concept,  depending  on  the 
circumstances of each case".
29 Generally, it is accepted that the "reasonableness" 
test  is  a  vehicle  to  ascertain  the  legal  convictions  of  the  co mmunity  or  the 
community's sense of equity and justice (boni mores). This has been described as an 
instrument of judicial policy.
30 In  Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Basdeo
31 the court noted that— 
 
the  value  judgment  on  which  the  application  of  the  general  criterion  of 
reasonableness is based, is on considerations of morality and policy and the court's 
perception of the legal convictions of the community, and entails a consideration of 
all the circumstances of the case.
32  
 
In  conducting  such  an  enquiry,  the  court  must  be  guided  by  values  and  norms 
underlying the Constitution. The Constitution, being the supreme law of the land, is 
a system of objective, normative values for legal purposes. An approach to the "legal 
convictions" test would be informed by the foundational values of the Constitution, 
namely "human dignity, equality and freedom". 
33 Such an approach will have as its 
basis  the  circumstances  and  perceptions  of  the  accused.  Section  9  of  the 
Constitution requires that courts have regard to the particular circumstances of the 
accused.
34  
 
Although it has been noted that the objective test is subject to the qualification that 
the person acting in self-defence may not benefit from prior knowledge that he has 
of his attacker, which the reasonable person would not have,
35 it would appear as if 
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the courts are moving towards a more qualified objective test of self-defence. This 
point was made clear in S v Ntuli
36 where Holmes JA noted that the South African 
courts have always insisted that they must b e careful to avoid the role of armchair 
critics, wise after the event, and weighing the matter in the secluded security of the 
court-room. The approach is that "in applying these formulations [the triggering 
conditions] to flesh and blood facts, the courts adopt a robust attitude, not seeking 
to measure with nice intellectual callipers the precise bounds of legitimate self -
defence". 
37 
 
In S v Engelbrecht
38 the accused had been the victim of domestic violence for a 
number of years. This included not only phys ical but also psychological abuse. On 
the day of the deceased's death he had been drinking and watching pornography. 
The deceased indicated to his wife that he wished to act out a scene in a video that 
he was watching. While the accused was submitting to the deceased's demands, the 
accused's daughter walked into the bedroom.
39 Later  that night, the  accused's 
daughter accidentally knocked the deceased in the face.
40 He screamed at her and 
hit her, and forbade the accused to talk to her daughter. If she failed  to heed his 
instructions, he said she would be killed. The accused then proceeded to kill her 
sleeping husband by locking his thumbs in thumb cuffs behind him and tied a plastic 
bag around his head which subsequently caused him to suffocate.
41 In this case, 
Satchwell J held that self-defence had to be evaluated objectively, and is based on a 
consideration of what would have been reasonable in the situation the accused 
found herself in.
42 The judge noted  that "the reasonable woman must not be 
forgotten in the analysis and deserves to be as much part of the objective standard 
of a reasonable person as does the reasonable man". 
43 Therefore, on this basis it 
was held that:  
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There is indeed compelling justification for focusing not only on the specific form 
which  the  abuse  may  have  over  time  and  in  particular  circumstances,  but 
pertinently on the impact of the abuse upon the psyche, make-up and entire world 
view of an abused woman.
44 
 
By thus taking into account the accused's situation the court relaxed the traditional 
requirements for self-defence. Satchwell J went on to state that in determining the 
lawfulness of the self-defensive act, the "attack" element has become more broadly 
defined: "one individual incident of abuse, a series of violations or an on-going cycle 
of maltreatment".
45 
 
With regards to the imminence requirement, the court followed the finding in the 
Canadian case of R v Lavallee,
46 where it was held that requiring a systematically -
abused woman to wait until the commencement of an attack to defend her self is 
"tantamount to sentencing her to murder by instalment".
47 Satchwell J decided to 
reinterpret the common law by adopting the Canadian approach to address this 
shortcoming: 
 
where abuse is frequent and regular such that it can be termed a 'pattern' or 'cycle' 
of abuse then it would seem that the requirement of imminence should extend to 
encompass that which is inevitable.
48 
 
The judge went on to explain, that in order to determine if the action taken was 
necessary, the extent to which it was necessary would have to be established, as 
also  to  what  extent  the  normal  legal  channels  were  ineffective.  While  Mrs 
Engelbrecht's efforts to leave her husband were taken into consideration, Satchwell J 
adopted a cautionary approach in this regard: 
 
[I] am of the view that the court must, in this context, be extremely cautious in 
seeking  to  rely  upon  examination  of  the  efforts  taken  by  an  abused  woman  to 
extricate  herself  from  the  abusive  situation  or  to  escape  the  abusive  spouse  or 
partner.  Judgment  should  not  be  passed  on  the  fact  that  an  accused  battered 
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woman stayed in the abusive relationship. Still less is the court entitled to conclude 
that she forfeited her right to self-defence for having done so.
49 
 
In discussing the proportionality requirement, Satchwell J noted that in the case of 
an abused woman, her particular circumstances should be taken into account: 
 
the  parties  respective  ages;  the  relative  strengths,  gender  socialization  and 
experiences; the nature duration and development of their relationship; the content 
of  their  relationship,  including  power  relations  on  an  economic,  sexual,  social, 
familial,  employment  and  socio-religious  level;  the  nature,  the  extent,  duration, 
persistence  of  the  abuse;  the  purpose  of  and  achievements  of  the  abuser,  the 
impact upon the body, mind, heart, spirit of the victim; the effect on others who 
are aware of or implicated in the abuse; the extent to which it is possible for State-
legislated, formal institutional, informal personal bodies and individuals to intervene 
to terminate the abuse; the extent to which it is possible for the abused victim to 
access and utilize any of the above channels in the event that they previously failed 
and to unilaterally intervene to impose constitutional protections.
50 
 
Satchwell J went on to note that in evaluating if the actions taken by the accused 
were  reasonable,  the  analysis  is  partly  objective  and  partly  subjective.
51 Placing 
emphasis  on  the  accused's  individual  circumstances  could  have  the  effect  of 
subjectivising the test for self-defence. This raises the question: if the Engelbrecht 
case is correct, would it not have been better dealt with as an instance of putative 
self-defence? In terms of current South African law, if a battered woman is not able 
to successfully plead self-defence because the court found her conduct was unlawful, 
objectively assessed,
52 then she may be acquitted of murder on the basis of putative 
private defence, which is subjectively assessed. 
53 In S v De Oliviera
54 it was held 
that such a defence would be of assistance to an accused "who honestly believes his 
life ... [is] in danger, but objectively viewed [it is] not".
55 This honest but incorrect 
belief would eliminate the necessary intention to commit such an unlawful act. 
Furthermore, the test for intention is subjectively assessed: 
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The  focus  of  attention  in  ascertaining  whether  or  not  intention  existed  is  the 
woman's  subjective  state  of  mind.  The  fact  that  her  belief  may  have  been 
unreasonable or even foolish under the circumstances is of no consequence at all 
as this enquiry does not concern itself with what a reasonable person would have 
done under the same circumstances.
56 
 
Furthermore, the "social framework or circumstances that may have impacted on the 
woman's  conduct  would  have  a  bearing  on  the  determination  of  the  woman's 
culpability".
57 Evidence of the "cyclical nature of abuse" as well as the woman's 
failed attempts at leaving her abuser would be highly relevant to inform putative 
self-defence.
58 For this reason, if a reasonable person located in the extraordinary  
circumstances of the accused would not have foreseen that the resort to self -
defence was unlawful, then the abused woman cannot be expected to have such 
foresight. In such circumstances "her lack of foresight would not be regarded as 
negligent and a charg e of culpable homicide would fail". 
59 It is submitted that 
putative self-defence is highly relevant to the abused woman who kills her abuser in 
circumstances  that  fall  outside  the  parameters  of  private  defence,  as  it  may 
represent  the  difference  between  a  conviction  of  murder  and  one  of  culpable 
homicide in South African law. At its most extreme, it may even prove the difference 
between a conviction of murder and a complete acquittal.
60 
 
The  second  requirement  is  that  the  private  defence  may  be  resorted  to  only  in 
respect of a legally recognised protected interest in law. Many legal systems have 
approached the question of what interests may be protected by private defence in a 
casuistic fashion, and this results in not all legal interests being recognised as the 
subject of the private defence.
61 Section 7(2) of the Constitution requires the State 
to "respect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights".
62 The foundational 
values of the Constitution include those of "equality" and "dignity." Sections 9(1) and 
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59   Reddi 2005 SACJ 276. 
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9(2)  provide  that  "everyone  is  equal  before  the  law  and  has  the  right  to  equal 
protection and benefit of the law", and that "equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms," while section 10 provides that "everyone has 
an inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected".
63 
The protected rights include those in section 12  "to freedom and security of the 
person", which cover the rights "not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without 
just cause; to be free from all forms of violence either from public or private sources; 
not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way", and also "to 
bodily  and  psychological  integrity",  which  covers  the  rights  "to  make  decisions 
concerning reproduction; to security in and control over their body". 
64 In addition to 
common-law  and  statutory  provisions  for  the  protection  of  these  rights,  the 
legislature  has  enacted  the  Domestic  Violence  Act   116  of  1998,  of  which  the 
Preamble states: 
 
Recognizing  that  domestic  violence  is  a  serious  social  evil;  that  there  is  a  high 
incidence of domestic violence within South African society; that victims of domestic 
violence  are  amongst  the  most  vulnerable  members  of  society;  that  domestic 
violence takes on many forms; that acts of domestic violence may be committed in 
a wide range of domestic relationships and that the remedies currently available to 
the victims of domestic violence have proved ineffective; and having regard to the 
Constitution of South Africa; and in particular, the right to equality and to freedom 
and security of the person; and the international commitments and obligations of 
the State towards ending violence against women and children including obligations 
under  the  United  Nations  Conventions  on  the  Elimination  of  all  Forms  of 
Discrimination against Women and the Rights of the Child; it is the purpose of this 
Act  to  afford  the  victims  of  domestic  violence  the  maximum  protection  from 
domestic abuse that the law can provide; and to introduce measures which seek to 
ensure that the relevant organs of State give full effect to the provisions of this Act, 
and thereby to convey that the State is committed to the elimination of domestic 
violence. 
 
The  Domestic  Violence  Act  has  comprehensively  defined  "domestic  violence"  as 
including physical and non-physical forms of violence, all of which fall under the 
rubric of "controlling and abusive behaviour ... where such conduct harms, or may 
cause imminent harm to, the safety, health or well-being of the complainant". It 
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would appear that the legislature has chosen to emphasise the effect of abusive 
conduct upon the victim, as opposed to the specific form taken by such conduct.
65 
 
In  S  v  Baloyi
66 the  Constitutional  Court  noted  that  domestic  violence  compels 
constitutional concern in a number of important respects. On the one hand, the 
Constitution: 
 
...  has  to  be  understood  as  obliging  the  state  directly  to  protect  the  right  of 
everyone to be free from domestic violence. Indeed, the State is under a series of 
constitutional mandates which include the obligation to deal with domestic violence; 
to protect both the rights of everyone to enjoy freedom and security of the person 
and  to  bodily  and  psychological  integrity,  and  the  right  to  have  their  dignity 
respected  and protected,  as  well  as  the defensive  rights  of  everyone  not to be 
subjected  to  torture  in  any  way  and  not  to  be  treated  or  punished  in  a  cruel, 
inhuman or degrading way.
67 
 
On the other hand,  
 
to the extent that it is systematic, pervasive and overwhelmingly gender-specific, 
domestic violence both reflects and reinforces patriarchal domination, and does so 
in a particularly brutal form ... The non-sexist society promised in the foundational 
clauses of the Constitution, and the right to equality and the non-discrimination 
guaranteed by section 9, are undermined when spouse-batterers enjoy immunity.
68 
 
The Constitutional Court endorsed the view that domestic violence is "systematic, 
pervasive  and  overwhelmingly  gender-specific."  It  "both  reflects  and  reinforces 
patriarchal  domination  and  does  so  in  a  particularly  brutal  form".  It  thus  also 
implicates the core values of equality.
69 
 
In  Engelbrecht
70  it  was  held  that  those  rights  which  were  enshrined  in  the 
Constitution  constituted the interests which were deserving of p rotection in this 
defence of justification. It followed that the interests which were attacked and which 
an abused woman could protect include her life, bodily integrity, dignity, quality of 
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life, her home, her emotional  and psychological wellbeing, her  freedom, and  the 
interests of her children. In short, she could defend her status as a human being 
and/or mother.
71 
 
Thirdly, the private defence can be resorted to only in respect of an attack that is 
unlawful.
72 The fact that the attacker is insane and lacks  criminal capacity does not 
cause the attack to be lawful and thus defence against such an attack is lawful.
73 In 
the case of an abused woman, the unlawful attack against which she defends herself 
or others may be one individual incident of abuse, a series  of violations, or an 
ongoing cycle of maltreatment. Not all attacks are required to be directed at the 
abused woman herself, but obviously there must have been some assault upon her, 
for her to be considered abused. The attack may, but need not necessarily , be 
physical in nature, and may include psychological and emotional abuse, degradation 
of life, diminution of dignity, and threats to commit any such acts.
74 
 
The  defence  employed  by  an  abused  woman  must  also  comply  with  certain 
requirements. First of all, she must prove that the defensive act was necessary to 
avert the attack, in other words, the defence employed by the abused woman must 
be necessary to protect the threatened interest. Performing the defensive act ought 
to be the only way in which the abus ed woman can necessarily avert the threat to 
her rights or interests. This is de cided on the facts of each case.
75 The basic idea 
underlying private defence is that a woman is allowed to "take the law into her own 
hands," as it were, only if the ordinary le gal remedies do not afford her effective 
protection. The rationale underlying this defence has been stated as ensuring that 
"justice should not yield to injustice".
76 As Snyman has noted, "[t]he defence deals 
with nothing less than the protection of justice  in the circumstances in which the 
police are unable because of their absence, to perform this task". For this reason, it 
is essential that the court critically examines the extent to which the "ordinary law of 
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the land" was effective in preventing the precipitating unlawful attacks, and freeing 
the abused from the attacks and their impact.
77 
 
The underlying and often unarticulated question is if an abused woman has a duty 
to flee the attack(s) rather than defend herself by killing. Snyman argues that there 
is no duty upon the attacked person to flee, because "this is a negation of the whole 
essence of private defence [which deals] … with the upholding of justice … not a 
capitulation to injustice".
78 However, he submits that "there is no absolute duty to 
retreat and that the approach of our law ought to be that the question of whether or 
not the battered woman could or should have retreated is merely one of the issues 
to be taken into account when assessing whether the abused woman's defensive act 
was allowed by law".
79  
 
In  Engelbrecht  Satchwell  J  considered  that  bearing  in  mind  the  "hidden"  or 
"concealed" nature of domestic violence, which is frequently confined to the privacy 
of the home, she was cautious about requiring the abused woman (and her children) 
to vacate their home, leaving the abusive spouse in full occupation.
80 The judge 
further held that flight may be thought to encompass efforts made not only to leave 
the home but also to approach state authorities such as the South African Police 
Service, the family violence courts, shelters, family and friends, and so forth, The 
response to the unarticulated question as to why, if the violence was so intolerable, 
the abused woman did not leave her abuser long ago, should be that this question 
does not go to whether or not she had an alternative to killing the deceased at the 
critical moment. Nevertheless, as was stated in  Lavallee,
81 to the extent that her 
failure to leave the abusive relationship earlier may be used in support of the 
proposition that she was fre e to leave at the final moment, expert evidence can 
provide useful insights.
82 
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Satchwell  J  noted  that  the  court  must,  in  this  context,  be  extremely  cautious  in 
seeking  to  rely  upon  examination  of  the  efforts  taken  by  an  abused  woman  to 
extricate  herself  from  the  abusive  situation,  or  to  escape  the  abusive  spouse  or 
partner. Judgment should not be passed on the fact that the battered woman stayed 
in  the  abusive  relationship.  Still  less  is  the  court  entitled  to  conclude  that  she 
forfeited her right to private defence by having so done.
83 
 
There must be a certain balance between the attack and the defence.
84 As Snyman 
notes— 
 
The upholding-of-justice theory principle plays an important role in the rule that 
there must be a reasonable relationship between the attack and the defensive act - 
that is, the requirement of proportionality in private defence. The harm occasioned 
by the defensive action must be proportional to the legal interests of the defender 
that are endangered and that are being protected by her However, when accepting 
the individual protection theory as the only basis for private defence, it could be 
argued that the defending party may fend off imminent infringement of her rights 
without the defensive action necessarily being restricted in any way. The problem is 
that  the  legal  order  does  not  tolerate  gross  disproportion  between  the  interest 
protected by the defender and the interest she is attacking … Disregard of the 
requirement  of  proportionality  leads  to  law  abuse  -  that  is,  disregard  of  the 
upholding-of-justice principle underlying private defence.
85  
 
The limits of private defence are difficult to describe with any degree of precision, 
since everything depends on the particular circumstances of the case. The approach 
to be favoured, which was adopted by the court in In re Ex Parte Minister of Justice: 
S v Van Wyk,
86 is whether the defender acted reasonably when he defended himself 
or his property. Put another way, the court will look at what may reasonably be 
expected of the attacked party in the circumstances of each case: 
 
This test allows the court to assess the defence in the context of factors such as 
the nature of the attack, the interest threatened, the relationship of the parties, 
their respective age, sex, size and strength, the location of the incident, the nature 
of the means used in the defence, the result of the defence.
87  
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In addition to  the factors mentioned, the court in  Engelbrecht  took into account 
factors which were relevant to the situation of the accused, and which could be used 
to show that her actions were reasonable in the light of her circumstances. These 
include: 
 
The  parties  respective  ages;  relative  strengths,  gender,  socialization  and 
experiences;  the  nature,  duration  and  development  of  their  relationship;  the 
content  of  their  relationship,  including  power  relations  on  an  economic,  sexual, 
social,  familial,  employment  and  socio-religious  level;  the  nature,  the  extent, 
duration, persistence of the abuse; the purpose of and achievements of the abuser; 
the impact upon the body, mind, heart, spirit of the victim; the effect on others 
who are aware of or implicated in the abuse; the extent to which it is possible for 
State-legislated,  formal  institutional,  informal  personal  bodies  and  individuals  to 
intervene to terminate the abuse; the extent to which it is possible for the abused 
victim  to  access  and  utilize  any  of  the  above  channels  in  the  event  that  they 
previously failed to unilaterally intervene to impose constitutional protections.
88 
 
While these factors noted by the court suggested that proportionality between the 
attack and defensive action on her part had played an important role, the assessors 
in Engelbrecht chose to emphasise help-channels which they felt Mrs Engelbrecht 
had not utilised sufficiently
89 - thus undermining the court's previous statements that 
proportionality between the attack and the defence was important.  
 
Secondly, the right of private defence can be exercised only against the attacker, not 
against a third party.
90 
 
The third requirement, namely the one of  imminence, lies at the heart of the 
justification of self -defence and forms the focal point  of this discussion.
91 This 
intrinsic limitation on the scope of self -defence ensures that citizens act only when 
the  state  has  failed  to  protect  their  legal  rights.
92 However,  the  case  of  S  v 
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Engelbrecht,
93 which deals with the position of a battered woman acting in self -
defence, seems to suggest that the traditional imminence requirement does not 
adequately cater for these women's situations. For instance, Mrs Engelbre cht killed 
her husband in a non-confrontational situation: while he slept she locked his thumbs 
in thumb cuffs behind his back and tied a plastic bag around his head in order to 
suffocate him.
94 A claim of self-defence in terms of the general principles of  South 
African law could be rejected on the ground that it was unreasonable to believe that 
such an attack was imminent. The conduct would therefore open itself up to being 
interpreted as an act of punishment or vengeance, neither being justifiable as self -
defence.
95 Ossification of specific rules of self-defence has been predicated on what 
a reasonable response to deadly force might be, and this is based on the paradigm 
of an encounter between two men of roughly equal physical size and ability. In such 
cases, the abused woman is clearly disadvantaged: a woman's response to physical 
violence is likely to be different from a man's because of his size, strength and 
socialisation.
96 The need for legislation
97 and the development of the "battered 
woman syndrome" to  expand the imminence requirement has therefore developed 
as a result of the inability of the courts to deal with cases of abused women. This is 
because they often involve an accused who is deserving of sympathy and who 
cannot fairly be blamed for her conduct, but who would have no self-defence claim if 
the law were strictly applied.
98 For instance, in Engelbrecht
99 the court adopted the 
Canadian approach, where it was held that where the abuse can be termed a 
"pattern" or "cycle" of abuse, then it would seem that the requirement of imminence 
should extend to encompass abuse which is inevitable.
100  
 
There have been numerous calls for the abolition of the imminence requirement. 
The problem is that something must stand in its stead to distinguish legitimate cases 
of self-defence from illegitimate ones. The focus of this article will be the variations 
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advanced  for  the  imminence  requirement,  and  why  these  theories  will  not  be 
practically applicable to South African law. 
 
2   Different standards of imminence 
 
2.1  An "immediately necessary" standard 
 
Robinson  notes  that  while  the  term  "imminent"  appears  to  modify  the  nature  of 
triggering  conditions,  it  seems  as  if  the  restriction  is  more  properly  viewed  as  a 
modification of the necessity requirement.
101 Practically speaking, actions taken in 
the  absence  of  an  imminent  threat  may  not  be  necessary.
102  Consider  the 
hypothetical  hostage  scenario,  where  X  kidnaps  Y  and  holds  him  hostage.  X 
announces that in one week's time he will kill Y. Each morning X brings Y's daily -
food ration. Should the imminence requirement be taken literally, it would prevent Y 
from using deadly force until X is standing over him with a knife.
103 If the concern 
over the limitation is simply to exclude threats of harm that are too remote to 
require a response, the problem cannot be solved by requiring immediacy of the 
threat, but the immediacy of the response necessary in defence. Removed from the 
issue of reasonableness, there is little practical difference between "imminence" and 
"immediately necessary." It  can further be suggested that the elimination of the 
"imminence"  and  the  implementation  of  "immediately  necessary"  does  not 
necessarily  signify  that  a  court  will  always  disregard  imminence  in  an  abused 
woman's case.
104  
 
The problem is that an "immediately n ecessary" standard obscures the important 
distinction between self-defence and other self-preferential acts.
105 In the original 
version of Regina v Dudley Stephen,
106 four men were trapped in a life boat with no 
food to eat for twenty days. Dudley made a decision to kill and eat Richard Parker, a 
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cabin boy, who had consumed considerable amounts of seawater, and was dying.
107 
After the three men had killed Parker they were rescued and charged with his 
murder.
108 Since Parker had not been a threat to the men, they we re not acting in 
self-defence, but would have to rely on necessity: that they had chosen the lesser 
evil. However, the court did not allow necessity to be a defence for murder.
109  
 
Furthermore, consider a hypothetical scenario where the accused in such a ca se 
claimed self-defence: the use of defensive force is premised upon an assessment of 
the probabilities and alternatives. For defensive force to be necessary, the defender 
must reasonably believe that harm is likely, and that there is no alternative to the  
use of force. The difference between the two cases is that while the first is a self -
preferential killing, the second is self-defensive. All self-defence cases are instances 
of self-preference, but not all self-preferential actions constitute self-defence. What 
is distinctive about the self-defence case is that the act of force is employed to ward 
off an unjust immediate threat.
110 However, in the first scenario, the act was not 
defensive, as Parker did not pose a threat to the men. It is submitted that self -
defence  is  treated  differently  from  other  necessary  acts  of  self -preservation. 
Although the killing may be objectionable, the right to self-defence cannot be denied. 
Current  law  reflects  this  sentiment.
111  Further,  while  the  argument  for  the 
abandonment of imminence is so that a defender should be able to act as early as is 
necessary  to  defend  herself  effectively,  this  can  create  problems  since  the 
"immediately  necessary"  standard  operates  independently  of  the  intentions, 
capabilities, or actions of a putative aggressor.
112 
 
While it could be correct to insist on a distinction between imminence and necessity, 
it could also be argued that the moral basis for the imminence rule is not correct. 
While it is true that self -defensive acts are justified responses to u njust acts of 
aggression, the problem is that an act of aggression does not suddenly become 
                                                 
107   Regina v Dudley Stephen 14 QBD 273 (1894) 273-274. 
108   Regina v Dudley Stephen 14 QBD 273 (1894) 274. 
109   Regina v Dudley Stephen 14 QBD 273 (1894) 279. 
110   Ferzan 2004 Ariz L Rev 247. 
111   Ferzan 2004 Ariz L Rev 249. 
112   Ferzan 2004 Ariz L Rev 249. S GOOSEN    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
90 / 536 
 
unjust  at  the  very  moment  of  imminence.
113 The individual who is planning the 
unlawful attack is already in the wrong even before the attack commences. However, 
it goes against common logic to wait until the attack is about to commence in order 
to be morally justified before acting to ward off the attack. However, this does pose 
the problem that the earlier the intervention occurs, the more likely it is the person 
is mistaken about the attacker's intentions (and the less chance an aggressor will 
have  to  change  his  mind  and  withdraw  his  defensive  attack).  However,  a 
presumption of serious harm is stronger when the abuser has a history of such 
conduct. Furthermore, such a   presumption can be viewed as analogous to the 
"bright line rules" that have developed in the body of constitutional law governing 
police searches and seizures. An example of this would be the amendment to section 
49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act,
114 where such force is justified if: 
 
a)  the force is immediately necessary for the purposes of protecting the arrestor, 
any person lawfully assisting the arrestor or any other person from imminent 
or future death or grievous bodily harm; 
b)  there is substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or future death 
or grievous bodily harm; and 
c)  the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of a forcible 
and  serious  nature  and  involves  the  use  of  life-threatening  violence  or  a 
strong likelihood that it will cause grievous bodily harm. 
 
The "future danger" principle is expressly used in the new section 49. Furthermore, 
in circumstances resembling private defence, it holds that an arrestor is justified in 
using deadly force intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a 
suspect only if there is a belief on reasonable grounds, inter alia, that "there is a 
substantial risk that  the suspect will cause imminent or future death or grievous 
bodily harm if the arrest is delayed".
115 While it has been suggested that using lethal 
force to affect an arrest implies that it is the nature of the offence which the suspect 
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has committed which provides the motivation for the use of lethal force, the case of 
S v Govender
116 quotes Tennessee v Garner
 117 to demonstrate the point: 
 
[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of 
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally 
unreasonable  to  prevent  escape  by  using  deadly  force.  Thus,  if  the  suspect 
threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he 
has committed a crime involving the infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force 
may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning 
has been given.
118 
 
This is essentially not a test of the seriousness of an offence but rather a test of the 
threat which the individual poses of "serious physical harm to others".
119 As Bruce 
notes: 
 
[w]hat the test in effect is that an individual who has (is reasonably believed to 
have) committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm, has thereby defined himself as posing a danger of such harm to 
other people. The test put forward in Garner and Govender is therefore a test of 
future danger, and the motivation for the use of lethal force, that of preventing 
future harm.
120 
 
The  two  most  important  requirements  in  terms  of  this  section  for  a  successful 
reliance on the defence are the requirements that the conduct should be necessary 
and proportional.
121 The problem in the case of abused women using pre -emptive 
force  is  that  the  requirement  of  imminence  is  not  the  only  consideration  in 
determining whether their conduct is justified. Not only should the abused woman's 
conduct be necessary, but also proportionate when acting to defend herself. The 
demand for proportionality can also be based upon constitutional considerations. 
The more important a fundamental right, the more comprehensive the protection of 
that right.
122 Thus, the battered woman's attacker does not lose his fundamental 
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rights in a situation of self-defence.
123 Her attacker is entitled to the constitutional 
protections offered by the state.
124 In the case of self-defence, the main concern is 
the prevention of an unlawful harm to the legitimate interests of the abused woman, 
by means of harming the interests of her abuser. From this standpoint (and of the 
state), self-defence presents a conflict between the state's duty to protect the 
legitimate interests of the battered woman on the one hand, and its duty to protect 
the interests of her abuser on the other hand. Therefore, the right of the abused 
woman to defend herself, as a right derived from the state's duty to protect the 
legitimate interests of all individuals, cannot be unlimited. The choice presented by 
the  state's  duty  must  find  its  expression  in  a  compromise  intended  to  supply 
reasonable protection of the legitimate interests of both the abused woman, and her 
abuser. In terms of the actual constitutional prote ction of fundamental rights, it 
makes no difference whether we are looking at the abuser or the victim. However, 
the  scope  of  protection  differs.  Since  the  abuser  is  the  one  who  unlawfully 
endangers the interests of the abused woman (her right to life, dig nity and bodily 
integrity), and she is merely warding off the assault  -  the unlawful attack is a 
consideration  that  weighs  against  the  abuser.  The  fact  that  the  abuser  has 
committed  an  unlawful  act  (or  is  about  to)  does  not  translate  into  a  total 
abandonment of a proportionality requirement. In other words, his wrongful act 
does not grant  the abused woman an unlimited right to protect her interests, 
regardless of the cost to the abuser. Self -defence thus requires proportionality, in 
the sense that the harm caused must not be disproportional to the harm prevented. 
Where we are considering endangering the abuser's life, we are concerned with 
preventing harm to the life or physical or sexual integrity of the victim. The demand 
for proportionality thus derives from the reasonableness requirements of a society's 
Constitution.
125 Moreover, self-defence is intended to preserve the legal order by 
granting every individual the right to ward off unlawful attacks. The protection of the 
legal order is the duty of the state, and it does so by means of its law-enforcement 
agencies. The power to do so derives from the state's complete monopoly over the 
use of force. The right to employ force in self-defence is a right that is derived from 
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the state's right and duty to maintain the legal order. Therefore, if the authority of 
state agencies to employ force is limited by the requirement of proportionality - then 
the right of an individual to employ force must similarly be limited in self-defence 
cases.
126 
 
Furthermore, case law does not seem to be clear on whether an abused woman 
should flee,
127 despite the rationale that justice should not yield to injustice.
128 When 
acting in private defence, the abused woman acts as one who upholds the law, since 
the state authority is not present to  protect her.
129 The issue is not balancing the 
value of autonomy against the aggressor's right, but whether the abused woman 
enjoys autonomy at the outset.
130 One suggestion in respect of the duty to retreat is 
to recognise putative self-defence - if viewed from the abused woman's perspective. 
However, as has been noted by acknowledging the impact that the battered woman 
syndrome had on her psyche, make-up and whole worldview
131 as being pertinent to 
the question as to why the battered woman did not retreat  - other factors will also 
have to be taken into account to satisfy the court that she had no option but to act 
in a particular way.
132 If the objective test is qualified with the battered woman 
syndrome, it is submitted that there will be little difference between self-defence and 
putative self-defence. The objective test will become the functional equivalent of the 
subjective test. This is in clear contradiction of the view that reasonableness must be 
facially neutral.
133 A comparable argument could be made for the fact that the duty 
to retreat must, from an objective viewpoint, be necessary. Where an attack is not 
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imminent, the battered woman is required to retreat. Such a position does not take 
into account the fact that a battered woman is more likely to be killed by her abuser 
when she leaves an abusive relationship,
134 and that women who flee often have no 
safe place to go.
135 Nevertheless, such a duty should be maintained, since the 
abused woman's situation can be adequately catered for within the reasonableness 
neutrality perspective. Since the requirement of imminence is political rather than 
moral,  the  element  of  imminence  must  actually  occur  in  the  real  world.  It  is 
submitted that where there is a gap between the theory of state protection and the 
abused woman's  reality of the police's unresponsiveness, it essentially becomes 
more  difficult  to  assess  whether  the  courts  should  be  required  to  recognise  a 
broader than usual right of self-defence. The problem is to formulate a precise test 
of how poorly the police have failed in their duties, and to determine a proportionate 
adjustment in the law of self-defence. Any underlying relationship of dominance and 
subordination should not bear on the analysis of self-defence, since the justification 
is weak.
136 As Snyman suggests, the question of whether or not there is a duty to 
retreat is academic, since in practice the question will usually not be whether the 
person should have fled, but whether she was entitled to go to the lengths she did 
in defending herself, in the light of the prevailing circumstances.
137 
 
Another  theory  suggests  that  necessity  is  not  a  temporal  concept,  but  rather 
expresses the underlying concept of inevitability or unavoidability. A necessity rule 
would ask if the abused woman had any choice to act as sh e did, in order to avoid 
the  grave  risk  of  death  or  serious  harm  at  the  hands  of  her  husband.
138  In 
Engelbrecht
139 the court followed a similar line of reasoning. It noted that the 
dictionary references to "imminence" include not only something which is about  to 
"happen", but also behaviour which is "expected" or "foreseen"  - especially where 
there is a pattern or cycle of violence. Thus, to the extent that her failure to leave 
the abusive relationship earlier could be used in support of the position that she had 
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been  free  to  leave  at  the  final  moment,  expert  evidence  could  provide  useful 
insights.
140  Judge  Satchwell  made  reference  to  the  writings  of  Stark
141  when 
explaining the psychological impact of domestic violence on the battered woman. 
The judge stated that i t was important to look at the pattern of overall coercive 
control present in the relationships, rather than specific instances of such control. 
Research suggests that it may be control more than violence that creates the 
psychological profile of a battered woman.
142 The judge went on to quote Stark:  
 
Work  with  battered  women  outside  the  medical  context  suggests  that  physical 
violence may not be the most significant factor about most battering relationships. 
In all probability, the clinical profile revealed by battered women reflects the fact 
that they have been subjected to an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation, and 
control that extends to all areas of a woman's life, including sexuality; material 
necessities; relations with family; children, and friends; and work. Sporadic, even 
severe violence makes this strategy of control effective. But the unique profile of 
'battered woman' arises as much from the deprivation of liberty implied by coercion 
and control as it does from violence-induced trauma.
143  
 
The court further endorsed the view that where the abuse is frequent and regular, 
such that it can be termed a "pattern" or a "cycle" of abuse, then it would seem that 
the requirement of "imminence" should be extended to encompass that which is 
"inevitable".
144 
 
2.2  Imminence as a translator for necessity 
 
Another  theory  which  has  been  suggested  is  that  imminence  is  a  fairly  good 
"translator" for the concept of necessity, even though the former is not the latter.
145 
It has been noted that because the imminence requirement is "merely a translator 
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for  the  necessity  requirement",  the  imminence  requirement  should  be  relaxed  or 
eliminated in cases where necessity and imminence conflict. The reason for this is 
that in cases of self-defence, the concept of imminence will have no importance 
independent of necessity. The evil to be avoided is to be avoided not simply because 
it  is  "imminent"  and  therefore  is  worse  than  non-imminent  harm,  but  rather 
imminence is required because without it there can be no assurance that defensive 
action will be necessary to avoid the harm.
146 
 
If it is true that imminence is a translator of the necessity principle, it translates two 
opposing views of necessity - necessity as an aversion to violence, and necessity as 
a liberty and a right. Theorists, who support this, do it on the basis of a theory of 
self-defence that is heavily invested with pacifism and social responsibility toward 
the victim's interest in life.
147 The idea is that an accused's act is justified when 
necessary, since he had no  choice but to act in the manner in which he did.
148 
However, this is not the only existing view of necessity. Theories of self -defence 
which focus on autonomy do so on the basis that "right never yields to wrong".
149 
The argument is that the killing is necessary when it serves to right the wrong of a 
deadly attack.  
 
These ideas of necessity in turn present two contradictory theories of self -defence: 
pacifist and libertarian.
150 The pacifist theory emphasises a view of necessity that 
"depends upon the need for the accused to avoid violence".
151 The libertarian theory 
suggests that self-defence protects the rights of citizens to respond to unlawful 
aggression. However, neither the libertarians nor the pacifists can assert that they 
have their own debate about self-defence. None of these positions actually describes 
the law of self -defence.
152 The law positively permits self -help remedies in the 
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majority of jurisdictions which allow the accused to "stand his ground" against an 
attack.  If  necessity  meant  what  the  pacifist  theory  suggests,  it  would  in  effect 
require retreat in every jurisdiction. This is not in accordance with current doctrine in 
South African law.
153 Thus, the law's necessity is not always as "necessary" as it 
appears. This is especially the case "if by necessary we mean that the accused must 
choose the least violent or most pacifist alternative".
154 
 
The libertarian posits a different idea of necessity. This argument emphasises the 
wrong inflicted upon the accused and his right to respond. The implicit claim i s that 
the self-defence law must acknowledge society's concern in preventing "private 
warfare", but that if the state goes too far in discouraging self -help, citizens will 
become the victims of violence. As with its pacifist opponent, the libertarian theor y 
fails to describe current doctrine. The law in most jurisdictions refuses to look solely 
to the wrong of the victim/aggressor as the sole measure of self -defence. Instead, 
doctrine has time after time conceived of the rules of self -defence in terms that 
require that citizens defer to government authorities. Most rules of self -defence can 
be reconceived not just as rules that identify "real wrongs", but as rules which 
develop a system that protects society from vigilantism. Rules of proportionality, 
imminence and retreat require in many cases that the accused should retreat. It is 
true that the right to act in private defence is subsidiary in nature and takes effect 
only where the state is not there to protect a particular person. Therefore, where 
help is available from the state (via the SAPS) to protect the person, such a person 
should not simply proceed to act in private defence. It would be a different story if 
the SAPS did not perform their duties. This is therefore the crux of the case: 
whether Mrs Engelbrecht afforded the legal system, the SAPS, and society, a fair 
chance of helping her. To put this another way, was her final act of killing Mr 
Engelbrecht the only reasonable option available to her?
155 The majority of the court 
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was of the opinion that she did not afford the legal system a fair chance of assisting 
her. There were numerous other options available to her. She was a strong and 
intelligent woman with qualifications and a profession, who was able to work. She 
could have left Mr Engelbrecht. She was capable of evicting Mr Engelbrecht and had 
successfully evicted him in the past, when his behaviour displeased her. She had 
asked him to leave her flat when he and his parents were drinking excessively  - 
which he did. She had not sought the assistance of the Social Welfare Department 
or other well-publicised non-governmental organisations.
156 In addition, a reasonable 
woman in Mrs Engelbrecht's circumstances would have, ought to have, and should 
have closed the door behind her after she had thumb -cuffed Mr Engelbrecht, gone 
to the neighbour, and summoned the police.
157 In addition, Mrs Engelbrecht had 
very supportive friends and colleagues who would go to extraordinary lengths to 
assist and help her.
158  
 
When considering the evidence placed before the court,  it became clear that the 
legal system, including SAPS and the domestic violence court, had been prepared to 
assist Mrs Engelbrecht. However, she had lost interest in the various actions that she 
had instituted. She had not appeared in court on the dates set down for the actions 
she had instituted, or she had decided not to pursue the matters. In her evidence 
she submitted that she had not been notified of the dates when her cases were to 
be heard. However, this claim did not hold any merit. She could have  tried to find 
out when her cases were going to be heard or reinstituted the actions.
159 Therefore, 
if the law never really embraced either the pacifist or libertarian vision of necessity, 
it is not unexpected to find both these ideas unresolved in doctrine,  submerged in 
places, like imminence, where they are difficult to see or judge.
160 If this submission 
is correct, then we cannot with assurance solve the problem of imminence by 
replacing imminence with necessity, or  by claiming  priority for necessity or by 
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demanding that imminence means the pacifist rather than the libertarian version of 
necessity. Each of these positions simply poses the question - it does not answer it. 
 
2.3  Distinction between justification and excuse 
 
The imminence question can also not be answered by referring to the distinction 
between  justification  and  excuse.  South  African  criminal  law  is  traditionally 
connected with the psychological approach which separates the enquiry into criminal 
liability with two distinct components, each with its own focus: 
 
The  psychological  theory  is  irreconcilable  with  the  indisputable  presence  of 
subjective  components  in  the  concept  of  wrongdoing  (definitional  elements  plus 
unlawfulness).  The  psychological  theory's  premise  is  that  culpability  is  the 
receptacle of all 'subjective' requirements for liability; it is the sum total of all the 
'internal' requirements for liability.
161  
 
In terms of the normative theory of fault, culpability lies in the blameworthiness with 
which  the  unlawful  act  was  committed.  In  this  case,  the  accused  is  personally 
blamed  since  he  committed  an  act  which  met  the  definition  of  the  proscription, 
despite being capable of acting differently. In terms of such an approach, "culpability 
is not a state of mind, but an evaluation of X's intention". It is a "negative value 
judgment on the commission of an unlawful act".
162 
 
Some  reformers  suggest  that  imminence  is  really  a  question  of  the  "battered 
woman's  perspective  on  imminence  ie  because  of  her  experience  she  is  more 
sensitized to cues signalling violence".
163 Emphasising the individual characteristics 
of the accused has led to the establishment of the "reasonable battered woman" 
standard.
164 Although the court in  S v Ferreira 
165 did not directly refer to battered 
woman  syndrome  (BWS),  it  would  seem   as  if  the  court  were  indirectly  giving 
credence to it:  
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Her decision to kill and hire others for that purpose is explained by expert witnesses 
as  fully  in  keeping  with  what  experience  and  research  has  shown  that  abused 
women do. It is something which has to be judicially evaluated not from the male 
perspective or an objective perspective but by the court placing itself as far as it 
can in the position of the woman concerned, with a fully detailed account of the 
abusive relationship and the assistance of expert evidence.
166  
 
Only by judging the case on this basis could the abused woman's right to equality, 
dignity, freedom from violence and bodily integrity be given effect.
167  
 
In a similar vein, in  Engelbrecht 
168 Satchwell J noted that the "reasonable woman 
must not be forgotten in the analysis and deserves to be as much part of the 
objective  standard  of  a  reasonable  person  as  does  the  reasonable  man".
169 
Therefore, there is "compelling justification for focusing not only on the specific form 
which the abuse may have over time and in particular circumstances, but pertinently 
the impact the abuse had on the psyche, make -up and entire world view of an 
abused woman".
170 Therefore, in determining the lawfulness of the self-defensive act, 
the "attack" element has become more broadly defined: "one individual incident of 
abuse, a series of violations or an ongoing cycle of maltreatment".
171 Following 
Lavallee,
172 it was held that "in requiring the systematically abused woman to wait 
until commencement of the attack to defend h erself" is "sentencing her to murder 
by instalment".
173 For this reason, Judge Satchwell reinterpreted the common law to 
address this shortcoming, by stating that "where the abuse is frequent and regular 
such that it can be termed a 'pattern' or 'cycle' of abuse, then it would seem that the 
requirement of imminence should extend to encompass that which is inevitable."
174 
In determining whether the action taken was necessary or not, it had to be be 
established to what  extent normal legal  channels where ineffecti ve,
175 and her 
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particular  circumstances  had  to  be  taken  into  consideration.
176 The end result of 
such an approach was that in evaluating whether the actions taken were reasonable, 
the analysis was partly objective and partly subjective.
177 
 
In answering the ques tion of how frequent the abuse must be in order to be 
described as a pattern or inevitable, it is submitted that there is no single, defining 
profile of an abused woman. There are many diverse "profiles" of abused women, 
since the abuse does not affect the m all in the same way, nor do they necessarily 
respond identically to the abusive circumstances. In  Engelbrecht
178 the court noted 
that trauma and reason can both co-exist within battered women. Since they live in 
circumstances where the danger and threat ar e ever-present, this may encourage 
the development of "survivor" logic. For this reason it becomes essential that they 
develop a heightened capacity to assess incipient violence based on prior experience, 
and their familiarity with their abusers '"warning"  signs and tactics. To be able to 
understand the psychological impact of domestic violence it becomes necessary to 
look at the pattern of overall coercive control present in the relationship, rather than 
at  specific  instances  of  such  control.  Dr  Walker,  wh o  posited  the  theoretical 
construct on which "battered woman syndrome" is based, proposed the cycle of 
violence theory, which refers to a three-stage recurrent pattern -"tension-building", 
"acute battering", and "loving contrition" - that characterises these relationships. The 
recurrent yet unpredictable nature of the violence plays a key role in explaining why 
an abused woman may not leave the relationship. Further, Seligman's theory of 
learned helplessness explains the woman's sense of "psychological paralysis".
179 Her 
cognitive perceptions and motivation to act are altered, since "repeated battering … 
diminish[es] the woman's motivation to respond. She becomes passive". Secondly, 
her "cognitive ability to perceive success [in the relationship] is changed. She does 
not  believe  her  response  will  result  in  a  favourable  outcome,  whether  or  not  it 
might … she cannot think of alternatives".
180 In this respect, it could be submitted 
that "battered woman syndrome" is considered a sub-category of the generic Post 
                                                 
176   S v Engelbrecht 2005 2 SACR 41 (W) para 357. 
177   S v Engelbrecht 2005 2 SACR 41 (W) para 358. 
178   S v Engelbrecht 2005 2 SACR 41 (W). 
179   Schulhofer 1990 Soc Phil & Pol 127. 
180   Schulhofer 1990 Soc Phil & Pol 127,discussing Walker Battered Woman 65-70. S GOOSEN    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
 
102 / 536 
 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) - an anxiety disorder
181 which is included within 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
182 The coercive control 
theory does not require physical violence then, but only that the victim perceives 
that there is no means of escape as a result of the abuser's behaviour. On this basis, 
it would seem as if the extension of the imminence requirement as articulated in the 
Engelbrecht
183 case would be justified only in cases involving battered women who 
have experienced some sort of cognitive disturbance. 
 
The problem is that if imminence is viewed from an abused woman's perspective, 
her response to danger will always be reasonable and therefore imminent. The 
subjective perceptions of the accused, even if well founded on BWS, will still have to 
pass the objective test.
184 This standard has led to the subjectivising of the test for 
self-defence. The terms "psyche" and "entire world view of an abused woman" tend 
to relate to the issue of culpability. Any issue relating to culpabi lity is dealt with in 
terms of putative self-defence, which is subjectively assessed. Therefore, from her 
perspective  "she  would  have  honestly  believed  [her]  life  was  in  danger  but 
objectively viewed, [it was] not".
185 If this is what Satchwell J had in mind , it was 
not expressly stated. No mention is made at any point in the judgment of this 
defence. While it may be difficult to establish which subjective factors should be 
taken into consideration, judges and defence counsel are expected to operate within 
the parameters set by the law: objective elements in criminal liability are objectively 
assessed in terms of actus reus and subjective or mental elements of the crime are 
transferred to the enquiry regarding the mens rea (state of mind) of the accused.
186 
The  reason  for  this  position  is  that  self -defence  is  regarded  as  a  ground  for 
justification where the emphasis is placed on the act and not on the person who 
acted  in  self -defence.  Accommodating  an  actor's  personal  psychology  would 
undermine this ground for justification.
187 
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Perhaps it could be suggested that Satchwell J was in fact alluding to the fact that 
the test of reasonableness incorporated both objective and subjective components, 
but that the appreciation of the situation by the abused woman and her belief as to 
the  reaction  required  needs  "an  objectively  verifiable  basis  for  such  perception", 
which  could  be  elicited  through  a  combination  of  evidence,  including  expert 
evidence.
188 The problem is that in determining if the accused acted lawfully, the 
test must remain objective: what the fictitious reasonable person in the position of 
the accused, and in the light of all the circumstances, would have done.
189 The 
problem is that a person acting in self -defence may not benefit from the prior 
knowledge that she has of her attacker,
190 and it seems as if South African courts 
are moving towards a more qualified objective test of self -defence. In S v T
191 the 
court went so far as to say that— 
 
The actions of both the attacker and the defender leading up to the attack are 
relevant with reference to the question of whether the boundaries of self-defence 
have been exceeded. A person who is prone to violence can as a last resort rely on 
the defence whereby the question will be not what the reasonable person would 
have thought but what the defender knows about his attacker.
192 
 
Requiring  that  a  person's  self-defensive  act  be  objectively  reasonable  raises  an 
important question: if the person's act was not reasonable, could they have acted 
otherwise? 
193 This point is critical, since South African law punishes only voluntary 
acts.
194 The concept of reasonableness necessarily entails acceptance of the basic 
Hobbsean/Lockean proposition that equal individuals in a state of nature cannot 
exercise complete freedom of action without interfer ing with each other's rights. 
Therefore,  in  an  attempt  to  mediate  this  inevitable  conflict,  reasonableness 
establishes  an  objective  boundary  between  acceptable  exercises  of  individual 
freedom and unacceptable interferences with the rights of others. This b oundary is 
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determined by looking to prevailing social norms.
195 However, it is submitted that 
the courts have gone too far in qualifying the objective test in the manner set out in 
Engelbrecht.
196 Assuming Satchwell J is correct in incorporating the actor's al tered 
perceptions (ie the abused woman's psyche, make -up and whole-world view) into 
the  objective  test,  this  would  prove  unworkable.  First,  in  cases  of  non -
confrontational killings, even where there is expert testimony explaining how the 
battered  woman's  s yndrome  affects  individual  perception,  the  judge  has  no 
meaningful way to determine whether that abused woman's belief in the imminence 
of danger is reasonable when viewed from her distorted perspective.
197 In the light 
of the fact that the cycle of domestic  violence has three distinct phases the judge 
would need to know where the abused woman's allegedly defensive use of force fell 
within the cycle, and how long each distinct phase typically lasted, before being able 
to determine the reasonableness of the perception of imminent harm. Therefore, if 
an  abuser  becomes  contrite  and  apologetic  immediately  before  he  fell  asleep 
intoxicated, it would follow from the cycle theory of violence that there was no 
imminent threat of harm, and no reasonable belief otherwis e, until the contrition 
phase was complete and the tension-building phase was well under way.
198 In other 
words, once the abuser has been very violent towards her, any implied or minor act 
of  violence  can  be  potentially  understood  by  the  woman  as  a  reasonabl e  and 
imminent threat to her physical integrity.
199 A further problem is that this model 
presumes that all abused women would have similar perceptions of and respond 
along similar lines to dangerous situations. Not all abused women share the same 
perception of the degree of immediacy of a threat, nor do they respond in the same 
way.
200 Furthermore, even if battered woman syndrome was useful in supporting an 
abused woman's account of her subjective perceptions, the theory would do little to 
support a claim that such perceptions were objectively reasonable. Where an abused 
woman subjectively but unreasonably believes that her use of force is justified, she 
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has a claim of putative self-defence which may lead to an acquittal.
201 Second, even 
if  the  court  were  to  disre gard  the  source  of  her  perceptions  as  a 
subjective/psychological  phenomenon,  the  actual  effect  of  the  syndrome  on  an 
actor's perceptions would have to be considered. While it is true that a battered 
woman who is afraid and isolated might respond more quick ly and intensely to a 
"threat" and therefore might overestimate the danger, it is clear that her initial 
extreme responses to abuse might become over -generalised and might occur in 
situations where there is no objective danger.
202  
 
While the argument of putative self-defence is available, if the objective test does 
not sufficiently retain its objective character it will become increasingly difficult to 
distinguish between self-defence and putative self-defence. Consider for instance the 
developments in the Canadian law of self-defence. In section 34(2) of the Canadian 
Code
203  the  term  "reasonable"  is  expressly  stipulated  when  determining  the 
existence of self-defence, as well as in determining the parameters of the accused's 
conduct. What is interesting is that Lamer J in R v Patel 
204 noted that in terms of 
the wording of section 34(2) of the Code, there are three constituent elements of 
self-defence: (a) the existence of an unlawful assault; (b) a reasonable apprehension 
of a risk of death or grievous bodily harm; and (c) a reasonable belief that it is not 
possible  to  protect  oneself  from  harm  except  by  killing.  It  was  necessary  to 
determine if the accused's perception was reasonable (objectively determined).
205  
 
The judge went on to note that— 
 
there is no formal requirement that danger be imminent. Imminence is only one of 
the factors which the jury should weigh in determining whether the accused had a 
reasonable  apprehension  of  danger,  and  a  reasonable  belief  that  she  could  not 
extricate herself otherwise than by killing the attacker.
206  
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Further, it would appear as if the term "reasonable" does not exclude factors that 
are beyond the accused's control.
207 Nowhere is this view more pertinent than in the 
case of  R v Lavallee,
208 a landmark decision insofar as the court  admitted expert 
testimony relating to battered woman syndrome.  
 
In respect of the hypothetical reasonable man, the accused's perception of imminent 
harm and the need for deadly force did not appear to rest on reasonable and 
probable grounds. The reason p roposed for this was that the accused shot her 
unarmed husband in the back of the head, as he was leaving the room. Wilson J 
noted that the court could not appreciate the accused's perspective without the 
consideration of expert evidence on battered woman syndrome: 
 
How can the mental state of the accused be appreciated without it? The average 
member of the public can be forgiven for asking why would the woman put up with 
that treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she 
love a  partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would 
expect her to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect?
209  
 
Expert evidence of the psychological effects of battering was therefore relevant and 
necessary to assist the court in  determining the mental state of the accused and 
ascertaining whether or not her belief in imminent harm and the need for lethal 
defensive force was reasonable, since "the definition of what is reasonable must be 
adapted to the circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited 
by the reasonable man".
210 The judge noted this expert testimony in assessing two 
specific elements: imminence
211 and necessity.
212 To satisfy these requirements for 
self-defence, the accused had to demonstrate that she reasonably believed that she 
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was in imminent danger of grievous bodily harm at the time she shot her husband, 
and  that  she  reasonably  believed  that  lethal  force  was  necessary  to  avoid  this 
harm.
213  
 
The reasonableness requirement imposed an objective standa rd on the accused's 
subjective apprehension of danger and the need for deadly force, and it placed in 
issue her state of mind at the time when she acted in self-defence: it asked whether 
her perception was based on reasonable and probable grounds. The rationale behind 
the imminence requirement was that defensive force can only be justified if the 
accused faces an uplifted knife or pointed gun, making it reasonable for her to 
suppose that there is no time to escape or get help.
214 On this reading of the law, 
the accused's defensive act would appear unjustified since her husband's back had 
been turned and therefore the threat was not imminent.
215 Despite this, Wilson J 
maintained that the cyclical aspect of battering relationships begets a degree of 
predictability to the violence that is absent in isolated encounters between strangers. 
Predictability therefore confers heightened sensitivity, which imparts a unique ability 
to detect subtle changes in the abuser's usual pattern of violence that may signal an 
escalation in the imminence of danger.
216  
 
Given this "heightened sensitivity", the abused woman did not need to wait until the 
attack was in progress to defend herself, since— 
 
Due to their size, strength, socialization and lack of training, women are typically no 
match for men in hand-to-hand combat … therefore she need not wait until the 
physical assault is 'underway' before her apprehensions can be validated … it would 
be tantamount to sentencing her to 'murder' by instalment.
217  
 
Wilson J went on to state that expert evidence on "battered woman syndrome" could 
show how the accused meets the necessity requirement in the law of self-defence. 
To  satisfy  this  requirement,  the  accused  needed  to  show  that  she  reasonably 
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believed that shooting her husband was the only way to avoid grievous bodily harm 
or  death.
218 To assist the court to understand why the accused stayed with her 
abusive husband, Dr Shane testified that repeated exposure to abuse had induced a 
psychological condition which caused her to believe that she was   powerless to 
escape, since "[a]lthough there were obviously no steel fences keeping her in [the 
accused felt] that there were steel fences in her mind which created for her an 
incredible barrier psychologically which prevented her from moving out".
219 Based on 
this view, the accused suffered from a form of "learned helplessness"
220 which 
caused  her  to  "[lose]  the  motivation  to  react  and  [become]  helpless  and  … 
powerless  …  paralyzed  with  fear".
221  The  judge  considered  that  this  evidence 
suggested  that  the  accused's  exposure  to  repeated  abuse  made  her  a  kind  of 
psychological hostage to her husband. When Rust (the husband) threatened to kill 
her on the night of his demise, her situation was not unlike that of a hostage who 
had just been informed by her captor that he would kill her in three days. The judge 
concluded that it would be reasonable for persons who found themselves in such a 
situation to seize the first opportunity to kill their captor, rather than to wait until the 
husband made his attempt to kill them instead.
222 The judge emphasised the point 
that it was inappropriate that a woman's failure to leave her own home should be 
used to cast doubt on her plea of self-defence, since— 
 
[It]  is  not  for  the  jury  to  pass  judgment  on  the  fact  that  an  accused  battered 
woman  stayed  in  the  relationship.  Still  less  is  it  entitled  to  conclude  that  she 
forfeited her right to self-defence for having done so … the traditional self-defence 
doctrine does not require a person to retreat from her home instead of defending 
herself. A man's home may be his castle but it is also the woman's home even if it 
seems to her more like a prison in the circumstances.
223  
 
Therefore,  it  had  to  be  decided  by  the  jury  "whether,  given  the  history, 
circumstances and perceptions of the accused, her belief that she could not preserve 
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herself  from  being  killed  by  Rust  that  night  except  by  killing  him  first  was 
reasonable".
224 
 
On appeal the issues of law were dismissed, the finding of the jury was upheld, and 
the accused was acquitted on the basis of self -defence. It is evident that the 
importance of this case lays in the fact that the court acknowledged that women's 
experiences were not captured by the hypothetical construct "the reasonable man", 
and therefore proposed the admission of evidence of "battere d woman syndrome", 
to counter this. Such expert testimony is relevant, because (a) it reinforces the 
accused's credibility; (b) it goes to the state of mind of the accused to show she 
honestly believes she was in imminent danger; and (c) it goes to the reasonableness 
of the accused's belief that she was in danger of death or grievous bodily harm.
225 
This finding found support in  R v Malott,
226 where L'Heureux-Dube's finding is of 
importance to abused women, since "allowing expert evidence in connection with 
battered wife cases can be considered as legal recognition that historically both the 
law  and society may have treated women in  general,  and  battered women in 
particular, unfairly".
227 The judge went on to point out that by allowing such expert 
testimony it is  now accepted that a woman's perception of what is reasonable is 
influenced by her gender and personal experiences.
228 The judge noted that such a 
legal development was significant, since— 
 
it demonstrated a willingness to look at the whole context of women's experience in 
order to inform the analysis of particular events. But it is wrong to think of this 
development  of  the  law  as  merely  an  example  where  an  objective  test  -  the 
requirement  that  an  accused  claiming  self-defence  must  reasonably  apprehend 
death  or  grievous  bodily  harm  -  has  been  modified  to  admit  evidence  of  the 
subjective perceptions of a battered woman … The perspectives of women, which 
have historically been ignored, must now equally inform the "objective" standard of 
the reasonable person in relation to self-defence.
229  
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The judge stipulated that the reasonable woman standard was another component 
of  the  reasonable  person  standard.
230  Regarding  the  enquiry  into  moral 
blameworthiness, the focus had to be on the reasonableness of her actions within 
the context of her personal experience, as well as her experience as a woman, and 
not on her status as an abused woman and the fact that she suffered from battered 
woman syndrome, and the judge went on to state that by 
 
emphasizing learned helplessness, her dependence, her victimization, and her low 
self-esteem, in order to establish that she suffers from "battered woman syndrome" 
the legal debate shifts from the objective rationality of her actions to preserve her 
own life, to those personal inadequacies which apparently explain her failure to flee 
from her abuser. Such emphasis complies too well with society's stereotypes about 
women.  Therefore,  it  should  be  scrupulously  avoided,  because  it  only  serves to 
undermine the important advancements achieved by the decision in Lavallee.
231  
 
By insisting on a reasonable woman standard and the (partial) practical realisation 
thereof  by  means  of  allowing  expert  testimony  concerning  battered  woman 
syndrome in determining the requirements and boundaries of self-defence by means 
of  the  reasonableness  requirement,  it  would  appear  as  if  the  standard  of  the 
reasonable person is starting to lose its objective nature. This is so because— 
 
the anthropo-legal universal process of deconcretisation is incessantly eroding the 
so-called foundation of private defence in criminal law. Reference in this regard is 
made  to  subjective  factors  pertaining  to  the  person  being  attacked  as  well  as 
subjective factors pertaining to the attacker.
232  
 
A  similar  trend  has  been  followed  in  American  law  and  is  beginning  to  be 
demonstrated in the South African law of self-defence. The end result of such an 
approach may be that "it is predicted that the legal requirements for private defence 
will  eventually  be  equated  with  those  currently  required  for  putative  private 
defence".
233  Not  only  is  the  process  of  deconcretisation  inevitable,  but  it  will 
eventually result in the criminal law element of unlawfulness becoming redundant.
234 
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3  Should  imminence  remain  a  requirement  in  South  African  law  of 
self-defence? 
 
It is submitted that the Engelbrecht 
235case unacceptably broadened the scope of 
private  defence  in  its  unanimous  opinion  that  further  domestic  violence  was 
imminent or inevitable.
236 On the one hand, it could be suggested that Satchwell J 
correctly considered the legal convictions of society in determining the unlawfulness 
of the conduct. The imminence requirement was in fact applied. However, this was 
done  in  terms  of  the  legal  convictions  of  society,  which  now  also  include  a 
consideration of the fundamental human rights as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 
Therefore,  perhaps  Satchwell  J  did  not  in  fact  dispense  with  the  "imminence" 
requirement.  Instead,  she  clearly  delineated  the  extended  meaning  of  the 
imminence requirement by noting that the cycle of abuse w as in fact "inevitable". 
Furthermore, given the provisions of sections 8 and 39 of the  Constitution and the 
consideration of fundamental human rights in the determination of unlawfulness, 
precedent is no longer an obstacle in the way of the adaptation of t he common-law 
requirement of imminence to comply with the values on which South African society 
is based.  
 
While it could be argued that constitutional norms could at least provide a broad -
based "principle" or set of principles on which to draw distinctio ns in determining 
which factors should be considered in extending the imminence requirement, it is 
submitted that this view is impractical. The concept of unlawfulness, which hinges 
on the legal convictions of the community, has not only found favour with  South 
African courts, but requires the judge not to impose his own subjective preferences 
onto  the  case,  but  to  seek  the  solution  in  the  sentiments  of  "all  enlightened 
individuals in society" or the "legal convictions of the community's lawmakers".
237 
The enquiry into reasonableness in the context of unlawfulness can accommodate 
only the generic facts or the physical act, assessed in terms of the constitutional 
rights, where the "reasonable man" test has become increasingly subjectivised to 
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take into account a number of the personal qualities of the accused. Although there 
is a need for flexibility in the area of the grounds for justification, and this makes 
objectivity more elusive, there have to be clear limits. Judges are expected to make 
value judgments in this context all the time, when they assess the extent to which 
an accused's conduct falls within the limits of self-defence. The realm of objectivity 
is in the recognition of pre-existing limits. The use of discretion in applying such pre-
existing rules is well-established, but it needs to be established if it is adequately 
countenanced. It is submitted that it is not. The concept fails to be objectivised 
sufficiently, and furthermore, judges are granted too much discretion in this respect. 
The Engelbrecht
238 case is a clear example of such unfettered discretion. 
 
While the Constitution does not establish a hierarchy of rights, judges and academics 
have acknowledged that some rights are more foundational than others, constituting 
a core of rights from which  others are derived. The right to life is antecedent to all 
other rights in the Constitution.
239 Surely the abuser's right to his life supersedes the 
abused woman's right to dignity or bodily integrity? It is therefore submitted that 
Satchwell J went too far when she declared that "even the quality of life, her home, 
her emotional and psychological wellbeing, her freedom as well as those interests of 
her children are protected by the right to private defence".
240 While it could be 
stated that all three rights are of great importance, from an objective standpoint
241 
these rights have limitations and to meet constitutional muster must be linked 
closely to its purpose.
242 As Ally and Viljoen have noted, "the use of violence, 
especially lethal force, can only be justified if it is necessary, that is, if it is the only 
means  to  avoid  death  or  grievous  bodily  harm".
243  Perhaps  from  the  abused 
woman's position
244 she was correct to kill her abuser. However, it is submitted that 
she had no way of knowing whether her abuser would  have killed her at that very 
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moment. Indeed, the abuse had been going on for some time. There were therefore 
less-restrictive means of extricating herself from her situation. She could have called 
the police or left the premises.
245 Although an abused woman is not expected to flee 
her home, in terms of the  Constitution, it is submitted that the abuser's life takes 
precedence over the abused woman's right to remain in her home. Not only did 
Satchwell J in Engelbrecht
246 not correctly identify whether or not the  limitation on 
the accused's rights was justifiable,
247 but the court failed to take cognisance of 
established precedence. Interpretation or development of the common law requires 
that the court must promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights. It is 
therefore meant to adapt or correct applicable law to reflect common law, not to 
change it in its entirety.
248 While proponents of the "battered woman syndrome" 
have attempted to introduce such evidence in cases (including the Engelbrecht case) 
to explain the circumstances that may have impacted upon the woman's conduct, it 
is submitted that South African courts  - in any event - already do this to a limited 
extent, as a matter of course.
249 
 
Later on, however, the court goes on to state that "the accused had not afforded the 
legal system, the South African police Service and society a fair chance of helping 
her. It had not been objectively reasonable in all the circumstances for the accused 
to kill the deceased when she did".
250 How many times would it be necessary for the 
accused to have contacted the police before it would have been sufficient for her to 
have killed her husband? If the violence is to be viewed as "inevitable", if the abused 
woman is suffering from "battered woman syndrome", then it bec omes clear that 
she could not have acted other than the way she did. It is submitted that the 
traditional element of imminence should remain in force. If the abused woman is 
being attacked and the threat is imminent (in the traditional sense), then she should 
be able to avail to herself of self-defence, although it should be noted that the court 
should  also  consider  the  fact  that  the  battered  women  placed  herself  in  this 
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dangerous situation.
251 In the case of S v Norman,
252 Judy Norman stayed with her 
abusive husband for 20 years. But now imagine that Judy killed her husband in a 
confrontational situation (ie where the attack was imminent). A woman who stays in 
an abusive relationship for 20 years cannot when an attack is taking place (that is to 
say when an attack is imminent in the traditional sense) state that she killed her 
abuser because she feared for her life. She had been attacked many times before. 
What makes this time different from the other times? She stayed, knowing that a 
future attack was a very real likelihood. The persistence of the attack (over 20 years) 
would militate against her claim of self-defence. In respect of putative self-defence, 
the abused woman's perspective and what she knew are critical. If this is true, then 
she cannot reasonably claim that she knew her abuser would kill her. Again, what 
would make this occasion different from the others? If, however, the abused woman 
"snapped" and really believed that her abuser would kill her, then she should be 
pleading non-pathological incapacity instead.
253 Therefore any reference to mental 
and emotional characteristics, including recognised psychological disorder symptoms 
(such as "battered woman syndrome") should not be included in qualifying the 
objective test.
254 Therefore— 
 
It would be better for the court to ask whether a reasonable person in similar (but 
not all) of the circumstances would have considered the threat to be imminent. This 
is the standard that is already used in South African law.
255  
 
While it is obviously true that if a reasonable person were defined to be just like the 
accused in every respect, he would arguably do exactly what the accused did under 
the  circumstances.  This,  however,  is  an  inherent  difficulty  that  self-defence  law 
confronts whenever it tries to determine which of the accused's characteristics are 
properly  considered  in  making  an  objective  inquiry:  the  perennial  problem  of 
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"striking the balance between the defender's subjective perceptions and those of the 
hypothetical reasonable person". 
256  
 
The case of S v Steyn
257 is a case in which courts have demonstrated that they are 
competent to take the abused woman's situation into account. In this case the 
accused shot and killed her former husband when he threatened her with a knife.
258 
The deceased had abused the accused both mentally and physically over a number 
of years.
259 On the night of the shooting, the accused told the deceased that she 
had contacted her medical aid to ascertain if they would pay for the treatment of her 
anxiety disorder. This statement sent the deceased  into a rage and he threatened 
and choked her. As a result she fled to the bedroom. However, since she was not in 
good health and required food before  taking medication for numerous medical 
conditions,
260 she ignored the deceased's instructions to remain in  the bedroom. 
When the deceased saw her his reaction was immediate and violent. He jumped up 
and proceeded towards her with a steak knife that he had been using to eat his 
meal with. She perceived this threat as deadly serious, and fearing for her life she 
raised her revolver and fired a single shot.
261 
 
In determining whether the attack was imminent, the court  a quo held that when 
the accused left her bedroom in order to fetch food from the kitchen, a reasonable 
person  in  the  accused's  position  would  have  for eseen  the  possibility  that  the 
deceased  in  the  condition  and  mood  he  was  in  might  attempt  to  attack  her. 
Therefore a reasonable person would not have proceeded to place herself in the 
position of danger where she might be forced to use a weapon to defend h erself. 
The court found that in this instance she had acted unreasonably and therefore 
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negligently.
262 The Court of Appeal found that the court a quo had misdirected itself 
by confusing the question of unlawfulness with the test of negligence.
263 At any rate, 
the test for negligence would arise only once it had been established that the 
accused's conduct was unlawful. 
264 
 
The court of appeal then turned its attention to the question of the lawfulness of the 
accused's conduct. The court noted that the conduct of  the alleged offender was to 
be measured against that of a reasonable person on the basis that reasonable 
conduct  is  usually  acceptable  in  the  eyes  of  society,  and  therefore  considered 
lawful.
265 Modern legal systems do not insist on strict proportionality be tween the 
attack and the defence. Rather, the proper consideration is whether  -  taking all 
factors into account  - the accused acted reasonably in the manner in which she 
defended herself or not.
266 The factors relevant to the decision in this regard would 
include the following: first, the relationship between the parties; second, their ages 
and respective genders (given that Mrs Steyn was female, and that women tend 
under normal circumstances to be the physically weaker sex, she may have had to 
resort to the  use of weapons to defend herself); third, the location of the attack; 
fourth, the nature, severity and persistence of the attack between the parties; fifth, 
the nature of any weapon used in the attack; sixth, the nature and severity of any 
injury or harm likely to be sustained in the attack; seventh, the means available to 
avert the attack; eighth, the nature of the means used to offer defence; ninth, the 
nature and extent of the harm likely to be caused by the defence; and lastly, the 
value of the interest(s) threatened.
267 
 
When considering if these factors are sufficient to take the abused woman's situation 
into account, it becomes clear that they are adequate. For instance, in relation to the 
location of the incident it is clear that it could not have been   expected of the 
accused to gamble with her life by turning her back on the deceased, who was 
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extremely close to her and about to attack her with a knife, in the hope that he 
would not stab her in the back. She would have had to turn around in order to 
return to her bedroom, by which time he would have been upon her and flight would 
have been futile.
268 In relation to the history of the relationship between the accused 
and the deceased, it was such that she never had been able to resist him or his 
unlawful assaults during the many years that she had been the subject of his abuse. 
This shows that her training in conflict management had been of no use to her in 
her daily life. She had clearly been dominated by him.
269 Given that she was in an 
emotional state and frightened as a result of having been assaulted by the deceased, 
she was entitled to leave her bedroom, in her own home, in order to get food. There 
was nothing unlawful in her action in doing so, and it cannot have been expected of 
her to telephone for assistance every time she needed to do something in her own 
home.
270 
 
What these factors demonstrate is that the court already takes the abused woman 
situation into account, to a limited extent, as a matter of course. Since no single 
profile of a battered woman exists, it would be inadvisable to expect the court to go 
so far as to attempt to assess whether or not the killing was a reasonable response 
for  a  battered  woman.
271  However,  the  court  would  also  have  to  take  into 
consideration the difficulty that the abused woman faced in extricating herself from 
this position. 
 
3  Conclusion 
 
By  utilising  an  imminence  requirement,  the  courts  have  been  able  to  limit  the 
intrinsic  scope  of  self-defence.  Although  it  has  been  noted  that  the  traditional 
requirement  of  imminence  does  not  adequately  cater  for  battered  women's 
situations, it is submitted that the variations that have been introduced in foreign 
law will not work in principle in South African law. Not only does no precedent exist 
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for  the  use  of  such  varied  standards  of  imminence,  but  the  range  of  criticisms 
levelled at these suggests that it would be better to stay with the status quo: the 
traditional element of imminence. Furthermore, any reference to the "'reasonable 
battered woman"' standard is unnecessary, since South African courts already take 
the  abused  woman's  situation  into  account,  to  a  limited  extent,  by  considering 
several factors when determining whether the abused woman acted reasonably. One 
case which has illustrated this point well is S v Steyn.
272 By rethinking certain factors 
in the situation as a set of relatively innocuous normative propositions, the abused 
woman's situation is consistent with standard propositions in the law of self-defence. 
                                                 
272   S v Steyn 2010 1 SACR 411 (SCA). S GOOSEN    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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